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German History 
 
FORUM 
Historicism 
 
As the rebuilding of Berlin’s eighteenth-century Stadtschloss nears completion, 
German History turns its attention to the phenomenon of historicism: to the 
recreation of historical artefacts and practices (sometimes at astonishing expense). 
Historicism reached its high point in the nineteenth century, when individuals and 
communities turned to the medieval period to address some of the challenges of 
modernization. But the urge to revive extended back into the medieval period itself 
and continues into the twenty-first century. What motivated and what continues to 
motivate such recreations? As a theme, historicism provides an opportunity for 
fruitful dialogue between premodern and modern scholars. It also challenges us as 
historians to consider the value of revivals, whether produced by Berlin politicians, by 
Hollywood filmmakers or by medieval re-enactors. What happens—or what should 
happen—when academic scholarship encounters public representations of the past? 
Preservation and recreation aid historical imagination and empathy: at their best, 
they can result in the creation of monuments such as the Neues Museum in Berlin, a 
building restored to its nineteenth-century form in a manner that leaves the violence 
of its twentieth-century history visible. Historicism may sometimes, however, stand in 
the way of meeting contemporary needs or seek to erase the more recent past, as 
the Palast der Republik did to the original Stadtschloss and as its recreation has 
done to the GDR building. Beyond these aesthetic and political battles over whether 
to preserve the diversity of heritage, there are other ways in which historicism is 
subject to contemporary demands. The complexity of the past may be imagined 
away, as when ‘medieval’ is invoked in the political discourse of today as the 
antipode of modernity, suggesting that the whole of the premodern period formed a 
monolithic unity. The editors invited Bettina Bildhauer (St Andrews), Stefan Goebel 
(Kent), Stefan Laube (HU, Berlin), Sue Marchand (Louisiana State University) and 
Astrid Swenson (Brunel) to discuss these and other questions. 
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1. The nineteenth century was the ‘age of historicism’, with Gothic revival, 
Romanticism and the cult of chivalry. Yet late medieval and early modern 
Europe had frequently employed historicizing forms and terminology, and 
historicism of course played a prominent part in twentieth-century German 
history. Moreover, it survives today in the form of ‘authentic’ tournaments 
(Ritterspiele), medieval markets (Mittelaltermärkte) and forms of re-enactment. 
How far is it possible to conceive of and treat historicism as a single historical 
phenomenon? 
 
Bildhauer: Ah, a lovely question to start with. And luckily all the examples of 
historicism given are more precisely about medievalism, the 
reception/invention/adaptation of the middle ages or elements of medieval culture 
and history, which I know something about (I don’t use the term historicism). 
Arguably, the middle ages themselves are the period when medievalism was at its 
most prominent. Medieval culture, especially secular art, literature and music, was 
largely dedicated to inventing a glorious past for the present, a time of larger-than-life 
heroes, of always chivalrous knights, of dragons and saints, of Arthur and 
Charlemagne. This goes not just for the late middle ages either: even early works 
such as Beowulf or Waltharius already hark back to a more glorious past, maybe 
before Christianization, maybe before the technology of writing affected the stories 
about these heroes. What we think of as typically medieval has always already been 
in the imagined past: we have never been medieval. Of course, the medieval did not 
call that past medieval or even antiquity, just the past. Nevertheless, it is from this 
store of figures and tales that much of the medievalism since then has drawn its 
material.  
 
So it is important to pay attention to the differences between medieval medievalism, 
Romantic medievalism, Nazi medievalism, contemporary medievalism and so on—
we wouldn’t be historians if we didn’t have the urge to historicize. And we wouldn’t 
be historians if we didn’t point out the arbitrariness of such periodizations. Actually, 
even looking at the medievalism of one period together is a departure, in the past 
decade or so, from the previous research culture that was almost totally dominated 
by case studies on particular instances of medievalism (one film, one novel, one 
building, one author). But in present scholarship the time is right for narratives that 
Page 3 of 39 
 
look at a broader sweep, that look at medievalism over a longer period. Chris Jones 
(in the new Cambridge Companion to Medievalism, and in his and my forthcoming 
collection The Middle Ages in the Modern World) has just argued that in British 
poetry, where medievalism has been firmly treated as a Victorian phenomenon, 
there has actually been a resurgence of medievalism in the past decade. In my own 
work on medieval(ist) film, I have found that the often-perceived current ‘boom’ in 
films with medieval topics does not come out of nowhere, but can be set in a broader 
context: film since its invention has always been interested in medieval settings. 
Looking at the entire 120 years of cinema together allows us to identify certain 
traditions of typical representations of the middle ages and of filmic strategies—its 
critique of writing, of linear time and of individualism—that might not be visible if one 
focused more narrowly just on contemporary films. Only by investigating 
medievalism across time can we see such broader continuities—and isn’t the 
challenging of periodization what medievalism is all about? 
 
Goebel: I am in two minds about this. On the one hand, I think, historicism could 
potentially prove a useful category for diachronic comparisons, as Bettina suggests. 
This is something that has gone out of fashion in our discipline, and that would have 
the additional benefit of bringing historians of the premodern and the modern periods 
into a new, hopefully stimulating dialogue with each other—as this forum seeks to 
do. On the other hand, I am doubtful that historicism in general and medievalism in 
particular can be understood and should be treated as a single, coherent historical 
phenomenon. I am not qualified to comment on the period before 1800, but even in 
the late modern era one can detect at least three distinct formations. Consider the 
rise, refashioning and rejection of medievalism over the last two hundred years or so. 
The nineteenth century might be described as the classical age of medievalism. The 
fact that the term ‘medievalism’ itself was a product of that age is significant because 
it lent historicism a new, self-reflective quality. In the aftermath of the rupture of the 
First World War, medievalism entered into a second distinctive phase, and here 
we’re talking about a cultural transformation rather than a variation on a theme. Pre-
existing medievalist idioms took on novel meanings from the context in which they 
were newly imbricated after 1914–1918. Prior to that conflict, medievalism had 
essentially been a discourse of identity, fuelled by cultural despair in the era of 
industrialization. In the aftermath of the First World War, medievalism transmuted 
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into a discourse of mourning in an age of industrialized carnage; it marked a 
blending between the cultural memory of a remote past and the existential memory 
of death in war. 
 
Medievalism, this amalgam of temporal notions, never recovered from the upheavals 
of the Second World War. Take the opening of the Totenburg at Tobruk in Libya 
[a fortress-style burial ground for the dead of the North African campaign] in 1955. 
This was perhaps the last, albeit unsuccessful attempt to celebrate or revive the idea 
of ‘chivalry’ in postwar Germany. Yet in the new public sphere of the Federal 
Republic of Germany this kind of language was promptly exposed to ridicule; it 
seemed a relic of a bygone age. I would argue this has characterized the third phase 
of medievalism. Medievalist diction and imagery lost the coherence and urgency they 
had commanded in the early twentieth century. Yes, historicism still exists today, 
although, I reckon, as an embellishment, as something that adds colour. However, 
very few people have sought to find meaning in evocations of chivalry or the 
crusades after 1945. I suspect that this trend has probably been more pronounced in 
the Federal Republic than in any other postwar European society. True, the great 
Staufer exhibition of 1977 generated much hype, just as computer games such as 
Medieval: Total War seemed to capture the imagination of young people in the 
2000s. Yet, today, medievalism is no longer a serious business but something to be 
consumed with a pinch of irony. 
 
Swenson: I think it is necessary both to pay attention to the specificity of nineteenth- 
century historicism and to consider the phenomenon beyond the confines of a 
particular period. To nineteenth-century commentators, their time’s relation to the 
past certainly seemed unique: ‘Our era and our era alone, since the beginning of 
recorded history, has assumed towards the past a quite exceptional attitude’, 
observed Eugène Emmanuel Viollet-le-Duc in the 1850s. No German writer (at least 
to my knowledge) captured the pride in the age’s historicism quite as sharply as the 
French architect, but his celebration of the modernity of historicism appears 
representative: the nineteenth century thirst to analyse the entirety of the past, to 
classify and compare it was novel indeed and I think we can follow Viollet-le-Duc 
when he battled against contemporaries who dismissed this new analytical attitude 
as merely some kind of fashion, or worse to him, a whim or weakness. No other era 
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(speaks the nineteenth-century historian in danger of overemphasising the 
uniqueness of ‘her period’) discovered as many unknown pasts. No period before or 
since resurrected the past with such gusto and confidence, and none turned to 
history in quite the same way to address the challenges of modernization. While the 
nineteenth century certainly saw the most dramatic clashes between past and 
progress, it was also the age most at ease with turning to the past to enable 
progress. 
 
Yet, regardless of nineteenth-century claims to originality, historicizing forms and 
terminologies had also frequently been employed in the preceding centuries, as 
Bettina shows, and historicism continued to play a prominent part in twentieth-
century German and European history, despite all modernist attempts to overcome it 
for good. I agree with Stefan Goebel that the dominant forms changed but I would 
emphasize more strongly the coexistence of multiple modes at any given time. I do 
not think, for example, that historicism has been entirely reduced to irony or 
commerce after 1945 or that nineteenth-century historicism necessarily lacked self-
deprecation or commodification. With regard to the example of the crusades 
mentioned by Stefan, for instance, in my own research on the uses of crusader 
heritages in the nineteenth and twentieth century, I see a lot of parallel registers 
operating at any moment—caricatures poking fun at Wilhelm II for posing as a 
crusader during his Orientreise in 1898 indicate that not everybody took medievalism 
quite as literally as the Kaiser intended, while Adenauer dressing up as a Teutonic 
knight in postwar Germany might be a sign that chivalry retained symbolic power in 
the early Federal Republic. I would argue more generally that the crusades, and 
other aspects of the middle ages, retained broader political meaning after 1945 as 
they were invoked to inscribe Germany into the Abendland tradition in the postwar 
years. Political uses did not stop here either: there are many instances of German 
cultural diplomacy that still draw on this history (for instance by celebrating the multi-
lingualism of the Order of St John in Malta as a sort of proto-EU) and of course 
debates about the relationship of Europe and the Middle East at the moment are 
afloat with allusion to the crusades. 
 
But back to the broader questions: how far it is possible to conceive of and treat 
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historicism as a single historical phenomenon feels a bit like Panofsky’s 
Renaissance and Renascences reloaded for modern historians. The difference 
between ‘historicism’ and ‘historicisms’ consists for me in the multiplication of pasts 
and the ensuing creation of ever more specialized disciplines to study the pasts, vis-
à-vis earlier centuries, and the lack of anxiety about recreating the past vis-à-vis 
more recent times. As foreshadowed by the debate about whether the turning to, and 
revival of, elements of antique culture at different moments during the middle ages 
meant that there were many Renaissances or only one, using ‘historicism’ beyond its 
narrow confines has the disadvantage of blurring specificities and the advantage of 
highlighting continuities. 
 
The problem of definition is not made easier by the multiple meanings of ‘historicism’ 
even during ‘the age of historicism’, used both to denote a mode of thinking and to 
describe revivalist practices. But it is this tension between hermeneutical and 
creative uses that makes this ‘-ism’ so interesting. To think across periods, other 
terms are also useful: ‘medievalism’ is more narrow in terms of period; ‘revivalism’ 
emphasizes the resurrection aspects; ‘heritage’ points to the idea of transmission 
(and represents, for some, the presentist uses of the past or the space in which 
attitudes to the past are negotiated); ‘memory’ draws attention not only to forgetting, 
but also to the tensions between the individual and the collective; 
Vergangenheitsbewältigung reminds us of dark heritages and the work necessary to 
deal with them. ‘Historical culture’ is perhaps the broadest, most open-ended 
expression. Most of these terms are somewhat anachronistic if applied beyond their 
period of origin, but, as long as they are used reflectively and transparently, they 
have their merit as they help to discern continuities and changes in different ways. 
So, yes, I think we should look at the different manifestations of historicism together, 
but not in order to suggest that historicism is in any way a unified thing. For me the 
interesting question is why attitudes to the past and to historical situatedness 
changed, and which competing forms of historicisms existed at any given point and 
why. 
 
Laube: It is virtually impossible to treat historicism as a unified historical 
phenomenon. In the English-speaking world ‘historicism’ refers chiefly to popular 
projects of historical remembrance or—with the prefix new attached—to an 
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innovative approach to the interpretation of literary texts that considers historical 
contexts as relevant as the texts themselves (Stephen Greenblatt). But in the 
German language this category has had a scholarly import since the nineteenth 
century. The modern discipline of history, with its focus on sources, took off in the 
first few decades of the nineteenth century, propelled above all by the work of 
Bertholt Niebuhr and Leopold Ranke. As this new discipline looked back across time 
it was guided by the key concept of Historismus, a method that recognizes the 
autonomy of the past, systematically liberating it from its status as the mere 
prehistory of a given present. The underlying premise here is that no era is better or 
worse than any other; in fact every age is ‘unmittelbar zu Gott’ (immediate to God), 
as Ranke put it. 
 
Historicism in this sense is closely bound up with the German tradition of the 
humanities, so it would certainly be worth considering its incorporation—if this hasn’t 
happened yet—as a Germanism into the English language, simply to avoid 
misunderstandings. Because ‘historicism’—as a way of referring to the multifaceted 
popular enthusiasm for history, which also took off in the nineteenth century—means 
almost the exact opposite of Historismus. In historicism, the past is intentionally and 
energetically geared towards the present. What does this mean? In view of the 
rupture triggered by a society undergoing rapid change—as a result of population 
growth and industrialization—there was a need for a social cement, and this 
contemporaries found not least in historical myths. These myths were kept 
permanently alive in the collective memory through songs, poems and 
commemorative events and through memorable imagery, places and objects. 
 
What is striking about these media of remembrance is that they deliberately reduce 
complexities. This is the only way of preserving historical events or themes so as to 
make them instantly retrievable. The goal was to familiarize people with historical 
material that they perceived as increasingly alien, such as narratives about Arminius, 
Canossa or Luther, to bring people closer to this kind of historical stuff they were 
beginning to turn away from. This gave rise to virtual conceptions of history, virtual 
because they function like fictions despite getting their themes from the historical 
record. They are reminiscent of fairy tales, which were of course never valued as 
historical documents but in the light of their spiritual content. 
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If we consider the commemoration of Luther in the nineteenth century, from a 
present-day perspective we perceive a profound tension between history as 
remembrance and history as academic pursuit: Luther, hurling his famous ‘Here I 
stand; I can do no other’ in the Emperor’s face; Luther, hammer in hand, nailing his 
theses to the door; and Luther sitting with his loved ones in a cosy scene in front of 
the Christmas tree, not to mention the ever-fresh ink stain in Luther’s room in the 
Wartburg—all the available sources indicate that none of this is real. While we today 
cannot be naïve about such popular historical constructions, these Luther myths 
were anything but arbitrary or spiritless. They translated what was known of the 
complex figure of Luther from the textual sources into powerful imagery that fitted 
with contemporary thinking. As Merkbilder or striking images intended to make a 
point, they had to be simultaneously historical and fictitious. No one knew how these 
scenes played out in detail. So why not inject a bit of drama into them? The 
alternative would have been to say nothing. 
 
Marchand: As the previous respondents have noted, historicism means many things 
to many people, and as Stefan Laube suggests, there are both popular and scholarly 
versions, and it carries both positive and negative associations. For scholars it once 
had a positive inflection—as the antithesis of presentism—but these days, all too 
often it seems to me, ‘historicism’ is a pejorative term; we see it through the puce-
coloured glasses of modern art, of modern architecture, or of Friedrich Meinecke, 
who made it the (Germanic) beginning of the end of universalist thinking. Recalling 
my years at Berkeley, I think historicism was largely used as a means of denouncing 
right-wing historical writing that purported to be objective, and thus failed to be 
properly critical both of class relations and of ‘high’ political history. It seems to me 
the term still carries a whiff of this old grapeshot, as well as an antipathy to the 
nineteenth century, which does, as Astrid suggests, play a central role in this debate. 
Although this forum suggests that we may be at the point of setting aside our puce-
tinted spectacles, it seems to me that we still often indulge in a kind of historicism-
bashing, expressing a sort of snobbery about nineteenth-century culture which 
overlooks the skill, imagination and individuality of its practitioners, and forgets that 
historicism is the rock upon which we have built our right to exist as professional 
scholars. Thus in my remarks I will opt for a capacious definition, and opt for some 
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rosier tints, though I am well aware that historicism (whatever it is) can foster some 
evils, among which I would list quietism, particularism and contempt for one’s 
contemporaries. I do not think forms of historical play—into which category I would 
put Ritterspiele and re-enactments, history painting and archaizing furniture—at all 
dangerous, though I must say that it is sobering to reflect on Stefan Goebel’s 
Totenburg example, and Stefan Laube’s fascinating definition of the term (in its 
popular manifestations) as a form of ‘social cement’ found in the historical myths that 
were kept permanently alive in the collective memory. But I would argue, still, that 
most historicism (excluding perhaps monumental architecture, or political 
propaganda) is not collective, but at base an act of empathy, a longing to understand 
the otherness of the past, an aesthetic urge to mix things up, an act of modesty, an 
engagement of the imagination. And, as such, I think we historians need to applaud 
it, and recognize that without it, we would have no scholarly standing, and no 
audience to speak to. 
 
My definition of historicism would be: a strong belief that the past is past, and that 
to understand it (or in art, to recreate its effects) requires us to adopt other forms of 
thinking than the forms we consider to be those of our own day. This definition 
appears to put the nineteenth century squarely in its centre—until we consider that 
Ranke’s catch phrase, to recount history, ‘wie es eigentlich gewesen (war)’, is almost 
certainly a direct translation of a line from Thucydides’ The Peloponnesian Wars 
(1.122). Renaissance philologists such as Lorenzo Valla knew how to separate the 
Latin of the 4th century CE from that of the medieval period; Reformation thinkers 
wanted to know, and to document, the actual principles, practices and elocutions of 
the early church. Renaissance artists were well aware that the Romans made domes 
in certain ways that had been lost to medieval craftsmen; the ‘quarrel of the ancients 
and the moderns’ of the later seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries was all 
about whether or not modern people could, or should, imitate ancient models, given 
the gap that had opened (thanks mostly to the advent of the modern sciences) 
between the two thought-worlds. The Enlightenment swarmed with history writers of 
various types, including ‘universal’ historians but also nostalgic (one might well say 
proto-Romantic) aristocrats mourning the loss of their privileges, and antiquarians 
(including numismatists and art dealers fearful of forgeries) hell-bent on investigating 
the peculiarities of Roman costumes, Welsh weapons and Mithraic altarpieces. Neo-
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classicism, neo-Gothicism (think Strawberry Hill), Egyptomania: they all begin in the 
eighteenth century, or before. Historicism did not leap, fully formed, from the heads 
of B.G. Niebuhr, or Leopold von Ranke, though the forms it took after 1815 are more 
specific in both linguistic and national terms, and more binding for anyone wanting to 
call herself a true historian. The peculiarities of Germany’s nineteenth-century forms 
have been hugely influential, and well worth the deep analysis accorded to them by 
John Toews, in his magisterial Becoming Historical (2004). But this is not the only 
form historicism has taken, or might take in the future. 
 
 
2. Historicism is an apparent paradox: it is about the deliberate preservation 
or revival of things that do not fit. What drives such preservation or revival? Is 
historicism merely a product of the deliberate instrumentalization of the past, 
of its invocation as a source of political and symbolic power? What other 
confluences of factors call forth intense engagements with historical forms 
and antecedents at particular moments in time? 
 
Swenson: It is these paradoxes that make historicism so fascinating! 
Instrumentalizations of the past have certainly been a source of political and 
symbolic power. However, important questions about the reasons for nationalist, and 
national-socialist instrumentalizations, that is, the question about the continuities 
between the two, have to some degree side-lined attention from other drivers in 
Germany. Elsewhere postcolonial and other forms of critical scholarship have also 
helped to sharpen awareness of oppressive instrumentalizations. Drawing attention 
to the abuses of the past remains an important task for scholarship, but we also 
need to be aware that a range of other motives drove historicism sometimes in 
parallel and sometimes in overlapping ways. Sue just described some of them 
wonderfully vividly. Scientific curiosity was a major driver before, during and after the 
nineteenth century. In a postrevolutionary world ‘stranded in the present’, to use 
Peter Fritsche’s phrase, turning to different aspects of the past moreover enabled 
both liberation from the old regime and a way to feel connected. In different ways the 
culturalization of the sacred and the sacralisation of culture spoke to individuals on 
both sides of the secularization divide. The creative potential also had enormous 
appeal, especially for the first generation of revivalist architects, artists and scientists 
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who meshed the discovery of the past with the use of new technologies born of the 
industrial revolution. They often mentioned their desire to create better and bolder 
than their ancestors. 
 
The pleasures involved in experiencing the past were important for creators and 
consumers of the past—including the pleasures of gore and horror—as the craze for 
dungeons and dragons since the late eighteenth century testifies. Sometimes this 
‘culture of history’ (as Billie Melman called it) was escapist, often it was political. But 
political motives were not limited to the wish to control populations. A number of 
utopian writers for instance wanted to use the art and creativity of the past to enable 
the development of socialism. Finally a range of personal motives drove the 
discovery or resurrection of particular pasts. Boredom, for instance, was at the 
source of one of the most well-known cases of political instrumentalization of the 
middle ages. The reconstruction of Cologne cathedral might never have happened 
had the Cologne merchant Sulpiz Boisserrée not felt trapped in the ‘parochial 
circumstances’ of his home town in 1799 and escaped to Paris where his interest in 
German art history was kindled. On his return he lobbied the world and his dog (the 
Prussian Crown Prince, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe and Josef Goerres, for 
example), to enable the completion of the cathedral, but the political remained mixed 
with the private. In his diaries he noted that the ‘occupation with the national 
monuments’ proved a ‘great repose’ to deal with personal grief. 
 
On a more collective level, grief and hope played a crucial part in the turn towards 
historical monuments during the wars of the twentieth century, when the destruction 
of buildings allowed written exchanges about death and destruction otherwise often 
censured, while the fact that some iconic buildings survived bombing raids inspired 
hope for survival and renewal more generally. Again the cathedral of Cologne is a 
good example here: the image of the cathedral standing alone among the rubble of 
the city after 1945 became a much photographed symbol for survival, and its 
postwar repair, which emphasized the cathedral’s history as a place of pan-
European worship, facilitated both local and Allied efforts to reintegrate Germany into 
Western Europe. Thus, while I believe it is our job as historians to deconstruct 
instrumentalizations of the past, it is necessary to take a broad view of motives—not 
least because we cannot 
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understand why instrumentationlizations work if we do not pay attention to the full 
range of emotions that drive interest in the past. 
 
Goebel: Is historicism actually a ‘paradox’? Allow me to take issue with the question. 
In the nineteenth century, industrial magnates commissioned some of the finest 
examples of Gothic revival architecture; in the First World War, the exploits of the 
Teutonic Order were invoked to make sense of mass industrialized slaughter. What 
might seem to us counter-intuitive or inconsistent, perhaps even absurd, did not 
appear in the least anachronistic or ‘paradoxical’ to contemporaries. In all my 
research into medievalism and the First World War, I have almost never come 
across any substantial criticism of war memorials featuring medieval knights. In one 
case, a citizen objected vocally, arguing that the chosen design was historically 
inaccurate: the artist had omitted the knight’s spurs—and that was said without the 
slightest sense of irony! What I am suggesting is that underlying your question is a 
(post-)modern engagement with medievalism and other forms of historicism that is 
more characteristic of the early twenty-first century than any period before circa 
1945. 
 
I also think that interpretative terms such as ‘instrumentalization’ or ‘symbolic power’ 
will probably set us on the wrong path. A lot of research into medievalism, especially 
in the 1990s, has focused on the aspect of identity politics in nineteenth-century 
representations of the medieval ‘national’ past and the importance of medieval 
history for the self-expression of an educated elite. It’s time to go beyond the political 
and intellectual and explore the grass-roots cultural dimension of historicism. Astrid 
mentioned that personal grief could trigger an engagement with the remote past. In 
fact, we need to recognize the emotional investment of ordinary people in 
medievalism—and its commercial application. 
 
A colleague recently purchased in an online auction a framed print of the official 
Kriegswahrzeichen of Dortmund, the ‘Iron Reinoldus’ (a wooden figure showing the 
saint in full armour) unveiled in 1916. The image itself is not rare, but what is 
intriguing about this object is that someone went to the trouble of having it framed, 
possibly for display in their ‘best room’ (gute Stube). This illustrates what, in a 
previous ‘Forum’ debate (‘Memory before Modernity’), Mitch Merback called ‘the 
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stubbornly “private” nature of even the most public rites of collective remembrance’. 
Medievalism could fill a deep-seated emotional need. This is not to deny that figures 
such as the ‘Iron Reinoldus’ had political function, too; the documents preserved in 
the archives can be used to shed ample light on this. Even so, we need to make a 
greater effort to explore the quotidian quality of medievalism and its material culture; 
we need to go out of the archives and libraries and into the museums and private 
collections, browse Ebay and ransack junk dealers. That leads me to my second 
point: the material evidence of brica-brac should also encourage us to reflect on the 
economics of medievalism. There was a veritable market for kitsch objects, and even 
though the history of consumption is a booming branch of historical research, 
bridging the gap between the economic and the cultural, it has not had a great 
impact on our field yet. 
 
Bildhauer: For me, the idea of the historicism/medievalism being a paradox is 
a great way of thinking about it. The middle ages certainly serve as a repository of 
‘things that do not fit’. They are modernity’s Other: whatever is not modern is 
projected onto the premodern. Bruno Latour’s theories of modernity famously 
analyse the contradiction between the official discourse of modernity—as 
enlightened, scientific, rational—and what modern people actually think, which often 
allows for things that science cannot explain yet; even science isn’t as cut-and-dried 
as Latour makes out. For many modern people, their beliefs still allow for the 
supernatural or transcendental in religious terms. There is thus what psychiatrists 
call ‘double bookkeeping’, a distinction between that which one knows one should 
think and can express in words, and other beliefs one holds but might not even be 
aware of. Some of the engagement with the middle ages comes from such ideas, 
that do not fit any explanatory systems, being projected onto the medieval past in 
order to find an outlet. 
 
But like the previous speakers, and reflecting the current academic resistance to 
keep writing history as a story of Great Men, of political and military leaders, I 
struggle with the notion of ‘deliberate instrumentalization’. Deliberateness, implying 
intentionality, free will, agency, is such a problematic concept. There are as many 
motives for engaging with whatever one is missing in modernity as there are people 
doing so, yet few of them can be called ‘deliberate instrumentalization’, which I would 
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associate with states and companies, political and economic interest groups who 
could be seen as having a deliberate strategy in this area, albeit probably even in 
this case not one that is consciously spelled out. The respected German company 
Vorwerk has just released a tool-set called ‘Twercs’, after the Middle High German 
for ‘dwarves’. Is that a ‘deliberate instrumentalization’ of the middle ages? I doubt the 
marketing people consciously thought an oblique reference to the middle ages would 
attract their customers, but they probably did do research that suggests their female 
target group thought that ‘twercs’ sounded cool, that they liked the translated 
meaning of the term and maybe even the fact that it comes from medieval German, 
too. I really like Stefan Goebel’s point that we need to pay more attention to 
economic interests. 
 
Valentin Groebner has observed a trend that could broadly be described as a move 
from political to popular medievalism. While the middle ages used to bolster 
politicians’ claims of nationhood by providing origin myths for modern nations in the 
distant past in ways that could be seen as deliberate, this is harder to claim for the 
current fashion in Germany for participatory medievalism—fairs, conventions, 
battles, games, concerts. It is now to some extent driven by commercial interests, 
but does not seem to have come out of a deliberate strategy on anyone’s part. It is 
as if by force of the fact that everyone has heard about them, the middle ages 
demand to be understood, claimed and framed as part of history somehow. In 
Germany, they are currently being claimed back from nationalist appropriations in 
particular during the Third Reich, and from the subsequent period when they were 
primarily addressed by academics. They are now becoming palatable again in 
popular culture, especially as mediated through the form of participatory medievalism 
that has come to Germany from Britain and the US and thus gives Germans back 
the middle ages not as a national past, but as an international past.  
 
That is not to say that political players have not tried and do not keep trying to 
instrumentalize the past, but this currently takes place not so much in the context of 
German nationality, but in the context of demarcating ‘Europe’ from ‘Islam’ by 
claiming that Islam and the Middle East are somehow stuck in the middle ages. This 
pattern is probably not deliberate, but it works very effectively to put the West in a 
position of alleged superiority, as has been very sharply analysed by thinkers such 
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as Kathleen Davis, and there is now an outcry, at least among medievalists on social 
media, every time a politician uses ‘medieval’ as a pejorative. We need to remain 
vigilant and argue against such abuses of the medieval, not just because they 
denigrate the dead, but also because they deepen political rifts. 
 
Marchand: What drives preservation or revival? Like Stefan Goebel and Bettina, 
I suspect that most often, those who seek preservation or revival do not have 
conscious or instrumental motives, but feel unsettled or displaced by things modern. 
(Of course one can find exceptions in the Nazis’ instrumental use of the Germanic 
past, for example— which by the way Hitler didn’t like, and which proved 
dysfunctional with respect to architecture, as well as to weapons production.) 
Sometimes even when preservation is meant to lead to a certain end, it can backfire. 
This was, for example, the case in the Austro-Hungarian Empire’s attempts in the 
nineteenth century to encourage preservation of provincial monuments or the use of 
local, ‘national’ styles for new buildings. Intended to create a sense of the polyphonic 
beauty of the empire united, this effort simply strengthened the nationalities’ hatred 
of the ‘baroque’ centre. But for the most part, I believe that people look to and revel 
in the pastness of the past as a means to indulge and strengthen their powers of 
empathy and imagination, or to relieve boredom, as in Astrid’s wonderful invocation 
of Sulpiz Boisserée. What do we say to our children when we take them to Colonial 
Williamsburg, or the Renaissance fair? This is how people used to live, kids; think 
about what it would be like to live your daily life without electricity, or anti-biotics or 
zippers! To get them to think about a past without Facebook that wasn’t simply 
‘stupid’ but had its own means of communication (and of shaming) is to ask them to 
stretch their brains and to empathize with others, even in a slightly gimmicky and not 
entirely authentic way. And we surely all believe that is a good thing. 
 
Of course there are dangers in too much empathy: in life, that of thinking the present 
is morally bankrupt and/or an aesthetic wasteland; in art, of crude imitation of past 
models. Those who overindulge in historical empathy (sometimes slipping into 
nostalgia) typically overstate the past’s grandeur, and the present’s flaws. But I 
would argue that nostalgia, or curmudgeonliness, is a natural part of the aging 
process. Older people who have given up trying to shape the world are often inclined 
to it, and balance out the 
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younger people, who, at least since the nineteenth century, have tended in utopian, 
or dystopian, directions. Naturally this makes for inter-generational conflict, but 
perhaps the juxtaposition of nostalgia and fantasy also has kept modern society from 
throwing everything into the dustbin on the one hand, or giving up all hope on the 
other. We must have a balance! Without people to remind us that the present isn’t 
the only interesting thing to know about, that today’s incorruptible gurus are strikingly 
reminiscent of the ones arrested for solicitation last year, and that recent art isn’t the 
only art (or music, or literature) worth admiring, in its own terms if not in ours, what 
would the humanities be? Could we even be historians without believing the 
indispensability of historical empathy? I don’t think so. 
 
Laube: There are a fair number of ambivalent or paradoxical things about 
historicism. On the one hand it is the result of the dramatic historical transformation 
ushered in by modernity, while on the other it freezes the era on which it focuses as 
if it were a solid block of time. In historicism the middle ages are devoid of 
development, of a before and after; it is entirely irrelevant whether we beam 
ourselves back from the present to the eighth or the fourteenth century. In the 
absence of population explosion, urbanization, industrialization, digitalization and so 
on there would be no historicism as a static platform of alterity. It is from the gap 
between past and present, which is perceived as ever wider, that the reconstruction 
or vitalization of past realities gets its appeal: we slip into costumes no longer our 
own, we consume foods no longer commonly eaten, play unfamiliar music with 
archaic instruments and practice peculiar dance moves. What is happening here is 
that people are using all their senses to get closer to a past reality through play, 
leisure time activities, the experience of community and amusement. Conflicts may 
arise if we remain external observers, in other words if we refuse to join in and—with 
support from the categories we learnt in the history department—cannot resist 
wagging our academic fingers. Many of those in Germany who are interested in 
history seem, without being aware of it, to have come under Ranke’s influence, 
repeating like a mantra that history must be committed to the truth or properly 
documented. 
 
And we do have to face the question of how far historicism ought to go. Is it 
acceptable to invent histories? The 2003 film about Luther starring Joseph Fiennes 
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in the lead role depicts an event entirely absent from the sources: a crippled girl 
walks after Luther prays for her. Hollywood conjures up a powerful image and quite a 
few of those whose knowledge of Luther comes solely from this film believe he was 
also a miraculous healer. This is probably a case of historicism going too far. On the 
other hand, it is striking that this film was shot on location. A revitalized history in the 
sense of historicism requires not just visual media in keeping with the times but also 
authentic material cultures. From the beginning of the nineteenth century the then-
new antiquarian and historical societies set themselves the task of preserving these 
cultures, which were intended to provide a firm anchorage for a society on the move 
to a new era. Amateur history enthusiasts dedicated themselves to collecting with an 
unprecedented passion. This obsession with collecting was to lead directly to the 
founding of museums, of which many still exist, such as the Germanisches 
Nationalmuseum in Nuremberg. Ruptures opened up within a single human lifetime. 
Individuals’ present experience increasingly clashed with what they had known in the 
past, in other words, there was a divergence between the realm of experience and 
the horizon of expectation (Reinhart Koselleck’s definition of the Sattelzeit). Many 
people would have lost their bearings without the continuities provided with the aid of 
historical objects, which helped plug the gaps in the present with historical cement. 
Alfred Lichtwark, a famous promoter of museums in 1920s Hamburg, once stated 
that there is a particular need for the collector during periods of transition between 
two worlds, as soon as the objects of the declining world have been abandoned. 
 
 
3. What, beyond the study of a community’s relationship with its own 
imagined pasts, can the examination of historicism offer the historian? How, 
for example, might historicism open up our understanding of civic cultures in 
German history; how might setting it within international frames sharpen our 
understanding of its presentation in German contexts? 
 
Goebel: Post-1800 historicism was intimately linked to the rise of nationalism, but 
at the same time, it was a pan-European phenomenon. Sir Walter Scott’s historical 
novels translated well into German, while Richard Wagner’s operas had enthusiastic 
followers in Edwardian Britain. In my view, comparative and transnational 
approaches (they are really two sides of the same coin) are essential in order to 
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understand not only national idiosyncrasies but also cultural convergences. The cult 
of Kaiser Barbarossa in Imperial Germany or the evocations of the Teutonic Order 
during the Weimar Republic will seem less ‘special’ when studied in their European 
context.  
 
While works that focus on a single nation still abound, I can think of a number of 
successful examples of comparative studies that have thrown national peculiarities 
into sharper relief, such as Charlotte Tacke’s exploration of the public image of 
Arminius and Vercingetorix in Imperial Germany and the French Third Republic 
respectively. To be sure, comparative history has an intrinsic tendency to 
concentrate on national peculiarities. Nevertheless, medievalism as a tertium 
comparationis can reveal striking cultural convergences between European nations, 
too. In both Germany and Britain, the survivors of the First World War found comfort 
in an imagery that connected the dead of 1914–1918 to wars and battles dating back 
to the middle ages such as Agincourt or Tannenberg. Medievalism as a mode of war 
remembrance allowed the bereaved to cope with their grief by imagining their loved 
ones as chivalrous knights rather than bloodthirsty killers, and the war as a crusade 
rather than a slaughter. Medievalism suggested hope of redemption through 
tradition; it entwined intimate responses with cultural ones. Such imaginative fusions 
of recent and remote events went beyond simply appropriating the past in an effort to 
authenticate the present or to bolster a sense of community and belonging by means 
of invented traditions. In other words, medievalism can be an avenue into the study 
of national identities as well as the history of emotions. 
 
To stress the commonality of medievalism in Europe is not to reject culture-specific 
responses. On the contrary, we need to distinguish carefully between class-cultural, 
milieu-specific, religious, regional and national variants of the medievalist discourse. 
The vitality of local societies and the plurality of agency facilitated the emergence 
of many different medievalisms. I would argue that the diversities within the national 
communities could often be as strong as the divergences between the nations. In my 
own research on Britain and Germany in the early twentieth century, I have found 
that Scots and East Friesians (proud of their respective freedom and shaped by 
iconophobia), Anglo-Catholics and German Roman Catholics (both open to religious 
spiritualism and ornamentalism), or British public-school boys and German 
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Gymnasium pupils (equally imbued with classical and chivalrous feats) had a great 
deal in common. To some extent, they shared more with each other than with their 
fellow countrymen. 
 
Swenson: I couldn’t agree more with the case for comparative and transnational 
history (and the links between the two) that Stefan Goebel just made. Although much 
research on the transnational nature of historicism still needs to be done, it is 
becoming ever more apparent how strongly the development of historicism was 
linked across borders in intellectual, economic, artistic and political terms. Even the 
most iconic national monuments were made through transnational exchanges. One 
can see this wherever one looks: German historicism influenced the frescoes of the 
Houses of Parliament in London via a Roman detour; international financial 
contributions from the Baltic to Mexico helped to complete the cathedral of Cologne; 
this in turn spurred the French to restore Notre-Dame cathedral in Paris. And these 
examples are only the tip of the iceberg. 
 
While post-1800 historicism was incontestably linked to the rise of nationalism, it 
was at the same time shaped by, and contributed to, the growing connectedness of 
the world. Exchange and emulation were important drivers, but so were competition 
and disappropriation. As ideas about the historic achievements of a community 
became increasingly linked with concepts of civilization during the age of 
imperialism, historicism also shaped the development of the international sphere, 
equally underpinning visions of dominance and of universalism. Without looking 
across borders we can understand neither the emergence, transformation and 
contestation of historicism in general nor its specific manifestations. The discussion 
of the previous questions has already highlighted that historicism can offer the 
historian many insights beyond the study of a community’s relationship with its own 
imagined past, as fascinating as this is. We have already talked about the history of 
emotions. Historicism can also open, among other things, a window into a 
community’s relationship with science, religion and art, into attitudes to common 
goods, practices of inclusion and exclusion, the strength and purpose of the state 
and of civic culture, and ideas about the local, the national and global. None of these 
areas can be understood purely through national history. 
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As Stefan Goebel has just said, the transnational and comparative analyses reveal 
that similarities and differences of opinion don’t necessarily map onto national 
borders. This is not to say that national differences do not matter. In the end, it is 
only by setting the German (or any other national) situation within an international 
framework that we can gain an understanding of distinctiveness, or lack thereof. The 
question of the relationship between historicism and civic cultures that you raise is a 
good example for this. The distribution of historical associations mentioned by Stefan 
Laube above, for instance, maps very neatly onto more general patterns of civic 
engagement in nineteenth-century Germany, as it does elsewhere in Europe. Yet, 
for a long time, attitudes have mostly been analysed within national frameworks or 
through asymmetric comparisons. More than in neighbouring countries, approaches 
to historicism, heritage and, particularly, Heimat in nineteenth-century Germany have 
been read in terms of their later development during the Third Reich. Arguments 
have largely been framed by larger assumptions of a German Sonderweg versus a 
European modernity, either highlighting the unique racist nature of Germany or 
drawing attention to the existence of preservation movements abroad to show the 
modernity of ‘homeland protection’ (Heimatschutz). But both positions are one-sided. 
Rejecting the idea of a German special path by drawing attention to the fact that 
similar forms of historicism and preservation movements were founded at the same 
time elsewhere in Europe and the United States means letting the Sonderweg return 
through the back door by assuming that British, French or American ways were 
progressive and therefore any similarities between German and other preservation 
movements must confirm the idea of German modernity. The existence of 
preservation movements in other countries, however, does not necessarily make 
Heimatschutz less völkisch. Yet, racist elements were also not unique to Germany. 
One therefore needs to ask different questions to explain the divergent paths in the 
twentieth century. Can the difference be attributed to the slightly less leftist nature of 
the German preservation movement during the nineteenth century? To its greater 
ability to federate? To the lower number of women in leadership positions? Or did 
the differences only emerge as a result of the nationalization of preservation during 
the First World War? It is not always easy to establish which differences matter, but 
as Marc Bloch observed a long time ago, if comparison does not always give us a 
straight answer at least it prevents us from running into impasses following local 
‘pseudo-causes’. 
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Laube: Historicism has become a self-evident component of civic culture and 
media society, fuelled to a significant degree by the rhythm of round-number 
commemoration days. The public culture of remembrance has become virtually 
inconceivable without the practice of anniversaries, and the approach of a round-
number anniversary automatically triggers a welter of activity in the culture and 
tourism industries (exhibitions, books, films, costume events, and so on). There is a 
tendency here to emphasize an epochal founding figure; through the lens of the 
round number, the myth of the men who make history seems to enjoy a never-
ending renaissance. Serious scholarship undoubtedly benefits from the anniversary 
as well. Without the opportunity provided by an anniversary and the attendant inflow 
of money, Lucas Cranach the Younger would never have been more than a sketchy 
figure overshadowed by his world-famous father. I have no doubt that the sharing of 
history via anniversaries will remain a powerful engine of historicism into the 
foreseeable future, though we are now seeing unmistakable signs of oversaturation. 
As a result, certain prominent dates such as the 200th anniversary of Bismarck’s 
birth are unable to elicit a great deal of media attention. But that the entire media 
industry remains fixated on round-number anniversaries is evident in a calendar that 
has sold very well among journalists and lists only newsworthy anniversaries of this 
kind—from 1 January to 31 December. A significant portion of media reports on 
history can be traced back to this calendar. 
 
I’m still sceptical, however, about the idea that such historical initiatives can influence 
political consciousness in any comprehensive sense. In 2017 Germany will be 
mesmerized by the Luther anniversary. The whole world will be looking at 
Germany— this, at least, is the hope harboured by the many masters of ceremonies 
who have been preparing for this event for years, despite a global population of just 
seventy million nominal Lutherans. Still, there are more than two billion Christians 
and 400 million Protestants. But will Greeks and Italians, if we look only within the 
boundaries of the EU, warm to this historical event? Parliamentarians in Berlin seem 
electrified: ‘The Bundestag declares’—to quote the emphatic opening words of a 
parliamentary resolution drawn up by all the parties in the Bundestag (with the 
exception of Die Linke) at the beginning of the Luther decade on 18 June 2009. With 
the momentum of historical developments, the resolution goes on: ‘As a key event in 
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the history of Christian Europe the Reformation fostered a view of the human being 
significantly influenced by a new Christian notion of freedom. The Reformation was 
important in the development of personal responsibility and individuals’ capacity to 
make up their own minds on matters of conscience. This was key to the 
Enlightenment, the development of human rights and democracy’. From this 
perspective Luther’s work is a crucial component of modernity, a foundation stone of 
our era that underpins human rights, freedom of religion and conscience. A very 
different dimension comes to the fore if we dive deep into in the past and try to 
understand the figure of the reformer in his own terms. Then we often find ourselves 
confronted with a disconcerting Luther, a man haunted by apparitions of the devil, a 
man who—not without a certain sense of pleasure, incidentally— supposed himself 
to be living at the end of all times and who wrongly predicted the end of the world on 
three occasions. ‘Luther is quite different from us’—Thomas Nipperdey’s dictum on 
the occasion of Luther’s 1983 anniversary has lost none of its validity. So every 
nation has its ‘holy cow’, whose holiness consists of a process of present-oriented 
selection. 
 
In England this holy cow is the Magna Carta, in France the Revolution, in the United 
States the Declaration of Independence, in Italy the Renaissance. It’s hard to shake 
off the feeling that Germany has set out to rid itself of its inferiority complexes when it 
comes to historical remembrance, to finally join the ranks of the major nations on an 
equal footing, true to the motto: ‘We are a normal country like any other’. Historicism 
in the sense of the playful, multi-sensual and didactic mediation of history is anything 
but a specifically German phenomenon. These ways of bringing history to life flourish 
in every country, particularly in those that can look back on a successful nation-
building process—some earlier, others later: the Netherlands, France, Spain, 
Switzerland, England, Poland, and so on. The transmission of history, which is 
simultaneously a form of remembrance of myths, provides a space for the 
manifestation of coherent continuities, a collective heroic biography as it were, in 
which everything has its meaningful place. Anyone who has ever visited Ireland’s 
heritage sites soon realizes that the popular presentation of history in Germany has 
long been a cramped affair lacking in levity and any penchant for historical 
speculation. Germany’s sense of itself as being on the right side of history was 
deeply shaken during the twentieth century, when German history was utterly 
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derailed, creating numerous taboo areas. Epoch-spanning narratives could gain 
traction here only hemmed in by caveats, doubts and footnotes. This has only very 
recently begun to change, in significant part through the rise of a new generation. 
 
In line with Stefan Goebel’s remarks, I think that nowadays historical 
commemorations are justified only if they are placed consistently within a European 
or global framework. We have to be cautious at a time when nationalist movements 
are burgeoning in many EU countries. Commemorative events run the risk of being 
overly national, of merely reinforcing boundaries and perpetuating clichés. I 
sometimes have the impression that a culture of forgetting would do more to foster 
international understanding than permanent remembering, which all too easily strays 
into a form of national stereotyping. To this day the Tannenberg/Grunwald complex 
can cause trouble between Germany and Poland. While we have no reason to fear 
that the ‘Amselfeld’ element will dominate the Luther anniversary, I think it highly 
unlikely that the associated festivities will culminate in fruitful attempts to grapple with 
the truly pressing political problems with which Germany will find itself confronted in 
2017. And these problems certainly do not include the need to create a tradition with 
reference to an event 500 years in the past that has been instrumentalized or 
abused for national ends. In the context of the immigration of refugees from Muslim 
regions, the politics of history faces quite different challenges. What we need to do is 
to read history and tradition afresh, looking for points of interreligious and 
intercultural contact over the past 1500 years. The ‘Near East’ (Naher Osten) gets its 
name from the fact that it is so close to Europe. And our picture of those from the 
eastern German territories, or from the islands of German culture in east-central 
Europe, who lost their homeland immediately after the Second World War also 
appears in a completely new comparative light against the background of current 
political events. 
 
Bildhauer: This question addresses what our ideas of the middle ages tell us about 
the present. I think the ways in which the middle ages are constructed today is 
shaped by the needs of the present, in particular the modern/premodern distinction. 
What makes medievalism so distinctive among recourses to other historical periods 
is that it is so clearly not modern, that the not-modern and the premodern are 
conflated. Therefore it serves ex negativo as a very clear mirror for the present (or 
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for whichever postmedieval period’s medievalism we are looking it): however we 
represent the middle ages, it is what we think we are not, but perhaps would like to 
be—or what we think we are, but perhaps do not want to be. 
 
Again, most of us seem to be thinking along similar lines here, as are many of our 
colleagues, in emphasizing that transnational and comparative studies are the most 
promising and urgent area for further academic research. When I tried to write about 
medievalism in ‘German’ film, it made absolutely no sense to see this in isolation 
from the films from other countries that influenced German filmmakers and shaped 
the expectations of German audiences, from the films that native Germans continued 
to make abroad, or from the international reception of German films—most films are 
international collaborations in one way or another. Just as medieval culture was part 
of a global context, so is modern medievalism, and so should medievalism studies 
be. We medievalists are slowly realizing that medieval German, Persian, Arabic and 
Latin writing, for example, were much more closely connected than we thought, and 
medievalism studies need to look further beyond Europe and the West, too. 
Analyses of American and Australian medievalism indicate how much there is to 
learn from comparative studies, and much more work needs to be done on non-
Western medievalism. 
 
Marchand: Perhaps one way we can sharpen our understanding of historicism is 
to recognize that this mode of thinking is not exclusively a German affliction or 
invention. I have been doing some work on the history of history writing in the 
eighteenth century, a subject which has made me keenly aware of just how hard it is 
to get past presumptions I imbibed long ago about the Germans’ ‘invention’ of 
modern history and its philological sidekick, historicizing source criticism. The 
presumption that history lacked critical depth before B.G. Niebuhr and the Germans 
got there belongs to a suite of other silly contentions about the shallowness of the 
French (and Scottish) Enlightenments on the one hand, and the feebleness of the 
German Aufkärung on the other. In any event, we modernists (these hangups were 
never, to my knowledge, shared by early modernists, and have been shown to be 
false by Donald Kelley and Anthony Grafton, among others) projected our linguistic 
and national specialties backwards, and never learnt, or dismissed facts such as that 
the (only) book that disrupted Kant’s famous daily walk was Rousseau’s Emile, and 
Page 25 of 39 
 
that Gibbon became so much at home in Franco-Swiss culture and ideas that for 
some time he wrote in French. We have horribly understated the impact on German 
historicism of Montesquieu and the Académie des Inscriptions, of French, British and 
Italian antiquarianism, and of Swiss and Dutch national histories. We have also, at 
least until recently, failed to recognize that a very great deal of historicizing was 
powerfully linked to biblical exegesis, and especially to Protestant attempts to 
understand the ‘authentic’ language and culture of the ancient Israelites. 
Understanding the Old Testament as a kind of simplified folk poetry—its miracles 
and improbabilities the product of God speaking differently to a primitive people—
was something Giambattista Vico and the British Hebraist Robert Lowth suggested 
before Herder got there. And Herder, as we know, built outward very broadly from 
this paradigm, in large part for religious reasons; but he did not give up on universal 
history, a subject on which Ranke lectured until 1834, and came back to (rather 
embarrassingly) in his old age. To understand historicism itself as a cosmopolitan 
phenomenon, originating (at least in this form!) in the eighteenth rather than the 
nineteenth century, but with roots that run much further back into humanity’s tree, 
might help us further integrate the German Enlightenment into its broader European 
ecosystem. 
 
 
4. Architecture is perhaps where historicism is most clearly legible today. Is 
preservation—Denkmalpflege—a form of historicism? How far should we 
distinguish between this and the material reconstruction of remote and 
idealized pasts embodied in projects such as the Dresden Frauenkirche or the 
Berlin Stadtschloss? 
 
Marchand: Of course Denkmalpflege is a form of historicism! It is indeed a key 
form—though we should be sure that here we mean the preservation and/or 
reconstruction of old monuments to their original look (not necessarily use) rather 
than the erection of new monuments to memorialize past events. We should be 
aware that ever since the birth of the historic preservation movement (which might 
well lie in unexpected places, such as early modern debates over renovations at the 
Church of the Holy Sepulchre, or over the laying out of new streets in Rome), there 
have been arguments about what it is that preservation is recreating: the evolution of 
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the building over time, which would mean in the case of a Gothic church, restoring 
both medieval windows and the baroque altarpiece added later, or the recreation of 
the original Gothic whole, stripping away the baroque altarpiece. Both forms can be 
understood as historicist, just with different historical reference points. I would argue 
that the Dresden Frauenkirche is really a historicist project, as the idea was to 
recreate the baroque church as designed by Georg Bähr, inside and out. The Berlin 
Stadtschloss is not, as the idea is to recreate only the façade, and to fill the interior 
with an entirely different and emphatically modern design. Both projects have 
political meanings of course, as is more often the case for architecture (which is a 
much more public and expensive form of expression than is, for example, interior 
design.) The Dresden project celebrates the collapse of Communism; it is also the 
case that the GDR government deliberately left the rubble on the site of the church 
(while rebuilding the Zwinger and the Semper Opera) for more than four decades to 
signal its contempt for religion and as a reminder of Allied cruelty—and an answer to 
the Coventry cathedral monument. Thus the rebuilding of the Frauenkirche, 
undertaken by private groups rather than directly by the city or state, may also be 
taken symbolically to represent the desire to heal the East–West divide, and 
(possibly) the will of some supporters to revive Saxony’s Christian identity. I must 
say that I liked the rubble field better than I like the rebuilt church, but that is simply a 
matter of taste: I prefer romantic ruins to baroque-frosted puddings. Both sites 
engage my imagination, whereas a modern monument in place of the church would 
not have the same effect. I remain completely amazed that the Berliners have, after 
decades of debate, opted to undertake the Schloss project, despite the fact that the 
idea of returning the Hohenzollern palace to the symbolic centre of town (and the site 
of now destroyed Palast der Republik) sticks in the craw of many former Ossies. I 
can only explain this by way of the Will to Tourism, the desire to have a place for the 
buses to unload visitors for a full day of museum-going in a kind of 
Kaiserwilhelmsland. This isn’t historicism: it’s capitalism. On the other hand, I think 
the half-historicism of the rebuilt Neues Museum, which recreates the nineteenth-
century space but leaves the building’s (and German history’s) ‘wounds’ in place, is 
spectacularly successful, so I will withhold judgment on the empathetic and aesthetic 
power of the Schloss until the project is complete. 
 
Laube: Nowhere does history act so immovably, so manifestly and to such longterm 
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effect as in authentic historical architecture. Denkmalpflege, intended to preserve 
historical remnants that would otherwise be lost, is indispensable to any historically 
aware society. The kind of destruction carried out in the late 1950s even in the 
West— such as the demolition of the Anhalter Bahnhof and Völkerkundemuseum in 
Berlin, whose structures were still intact despite extensive war damage—has 
become unthinkable. Having said that, a balance must be struck, on a case by case 
basis, between preserving the past and meeting the needs of a given present. When 
it comes to the everyday life of society, historicism has the advantage that, as a rule, 
it is related to specific occasions and acts on a temporary basis—that which is 
staged is put away again later—while Denkmalpfelge intervenes enduringly in the 
urban infrastructure and sometimes impedes residents’ freedom of movement. 
Denkmalpflege becomes ideological custodianship when the staff of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance, whose offices are located in the huge building that formerly 
housed Göring’s Reich Ministry of Aviation on Wilhelmsstraße, are condemned to 
stare at bricks and granite. Here the mise en scène of fascistoid monumentality 
 in a converted building takes priority over the creation of courtyard recreational 
islands that would inevitably entail the planting of trees. 
 
Another example: it would appear to have been imperative that Berlin’s 
Friedrichstraße be modernized on the basis of photographs from the 1920s. Hans 
Stimmann, Senatsbaudirektor just after German unification, made sure that no 
building exceeded the Berlin eaves height of twenty-two metres. In the area where 
Friedrichstraße crosses ‘Unter den Linden’, the houses are so close together that 
there is no room for cycle tracks. Rather than pursuing the illusion that the Swinging 
1920s can be brought back to life with the help of a frozen snapshot of that era, in a 
district featuring a university, museums and a library, a part of the city in which a 
huge number of people get around on two wheels, the city should have created 
public spaces that cater for current lifestyles. Denkmalpflege becomes 
presumptuous and unworldly when it clings to historical imagery while ignoring 
present-day needs. 
 
I agree with the thrust of Sue’s comments on the reconstruction of the Frauenkirche 
in Dresden and the Berlin Schloss. At the risk of hyperbole, we might add that even 
these historical reconstructions are concerned with the preservation or augmentation 
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of the original structures. Scattered fragments from the time of the building’s original 
construction adorn the church on the Elbe just as they will embellish the residence 
on the Spree. There is also common ground between the two buildings in that both 
help resolve the planning problem of a vacuum that must be filled. Nonetheless there 
are profound differences between them. As a result of the devastating bombing 
raids, Dresden lost its urban architectural identity, and in the shape of the 
Frauenkirche it lost that eye-catching element so central to any historical scene. 
Canaletto’s vedute set the standard here. Warsaw too was robbed of its identity-
creating architecture during the Second World War. In the Polish capital architects 
achieved something great through historical reconstruction: the authentic 
resurrection of a ruined historic old town. The preservationists even managed to 
endow the façades with a patina that gives every visitor a sense of strolling through 
centuries-old lanes. A markedly different picture emerges with respect to the 
reconstruction of the Berlin Schloss. The symbolic value of the Hohenzollern castle 
to the Berlin cityscape is not nearly as high as in the case of the reconstructions of 
the Dresden Frauenkirche and Warsaw’s old town. And here we are seeing the 
emergence of a hybrid, a baroque shell enveloping a highly modern museum. It is 
very hard to argue with sceptics who claim that the interior space and outer skin will 
never fit together. It would have been more honest to build to a design that, with the 
aid of historical references such as dome and cubature, radiated contemporary 
architecture both inside and out. Such designs did in fact exist but there was 
never any chance of their being implemented because Berlin politicians—why do 
they always have the final word when it comes to aesthetic matters?—wanted a kind 
of doll’s house from the outset. 
 
Bildhauer: Medievalism takes many forms, material and immaterial, but it’s true 
that nothing quite gives you the feeling of being in the middle ages as much as 
walking in or around the remnants of medieval buildings, Gothic cathedrals or 
hunched houses, and being able to touch them. Of course these are no longer 
medieval but part of the present, and no amount of preservation rather than 
reconstruction can change that. Although conservation techniques are increasingly 
sophisticated, they always alter the historical work and are in that way 
reconstructions. But then so does doing nothing and thereby allowing the constant 
alteration work done by decay, by the steady dulling of colour or softening of edges 
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over time. I am fascinated by the ways in which authenticity effects are achieved, 
and by what constitutes the impression that something is medieval: the fact that 
crumbly bare stone seems more authentic than the brightly coloured, brand new 
façade that buildings had in the middle ages. Film stage designers are masters 
at creating a medieval look that meets contemporary expectations, which seem to 
demand either a glossy exuberance of splendour and royal riches, or a universal 
brownness and dirtiness, as if the whole world was sepia-tinted and constantly rain-
swept in the tenth century. These in turn shape our expectations of actual medieval 
buildings, which are often used as film sets and altered in the process. I was sorely 
disappointed that Worms cathedral looked far less impressive in real life than in Fritz 
Lang’s 1924 Nibelungen film. 
 
Stefan Laube makes a great case for the imperative to balance the needs of the 
present and those of the past when dealing with historical architecture. While I am 
always frustrated when I visit a medieval church and am given no information to tell 
me which elements are Gothic and which neo-Gothic, it is also a pleasure to see 
layers of time and alterations accumulate on a living building that is in use, not an 
‘original’ somehow outside time. There is no original. And it’s curiously apt that the 
reconstruction of the Stadtschloss seems to be doomed not to achieve its final form 
for the foreseeable future, but remain a work in progress, just like medieval 
cathedrals were. 
 
Goebel: In the nineteenth century, the preservation or reconstruction of historical 
buildings was a key component of historicism and nation-building in Germany. The 
restoration of the Marienburg in East Prussia, the reconstruction of the Haut- 
Koenigsbourg in the Alsace, and the completion of Cologne cathedral are cases in 
point. The Second World War severed the link between historicism and built heritage 
conservation. The war’s legacy posed a twofold challenge: not only had medievalism 
lost its power to generate meaning, but Denkmalpflege itself now had to decide what 
to do with the ruined neo-medieval buildings.  
 
West Berlin’s Kaiser Wilhelm-Gedächtniskirche illustrates the inherent ambiguity of 
neomedieval ruins. The church had been built in neo-Romanesque style and was 
richly adorned with mosaics; it was an architectural style which had caused some 
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debate in Imperial Germany. As a consequence of the air raids on Berlin, the 
medievalist kitsch of the 1890s became an unintentional monument and was raised 
to the level of high art. In the eyes of the artist Alexander Calder, ruination had 
transformed the church into one the finest abstract sculptures of the world. This was 
a memorial of a frozen apocalypse, but it was aesthetically appealing all the same. 
The local population, too, grew fond of their ruin, which for them carried multiple 
meanings ranging from wartime suffering to eventual survival—but the original 
historicism no longer had any purchase. The ruined tower was left standing despite 
the reservations of the architect of the new Gedächtniskirche, Egon Eiermann. When 
the new foundation stone was laid in 1959, the surviving tower of the old church was 
characterized as a symbol of transitoriness. The ruined neo-Romanesque structure 
vis-à-vis Eiermann’s modernist building pointed to a historical rupture. The 
medievalist past had become a foreign country. 
 
The 1980s witnessed a number of spectacular attempts to revive the match between 
Denkmalpflege and historicism: the reconstruction ex nihilo of the 
Knochenhaueramtshaus in Hildesheim, the completion of the Ostzeile on Frankfurt’s 
Römerberg, or the construction of the Nikolaiviertel in East Berlin, to name just a few 
prominent examples. But did this postmodern historicism have the same deadly 
earnestness it had a hundred years earlier? 
 
Swenson: I wonder whether historicism is really most visible in architecture today? 
Is it not in hermeneutical terms that historicism left its most visible marks, by imbuing 
western thought with the belief that all ideas are located in a specific historical 
context rather than being absolute?  
 
However, as it is so wonderfully nineteenth-century of all of you to affirm Jacob 
Burckhardt’s belief in the primacy of architecture and Georg Dehio’s differentiation 
between conservation and restoration, I will run with it! Writing at the turn of the 
twentieth century, Dehio even went so far as to call Denkmalfplege historicism’s 
‘rightful daughter’ and restoration its ‘illegitimate child’. The vividness of the imagery 
helps explain how through propaganda and campaigning, especially during the 
socalled Heidelberger Schloßstreit—a quarrel about the potential restoration of the 
castle of Heidelberg around 1900 that mobilized national and international opinion—
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Dehio and other anti-restorationists changed public opinion lastingly. Few artistic 
practices have been vilified so eloquently. Henceforth ‘conservation’ has appeared to 
be the antithesis of ‘restoration’. The language used to criticize reconstructions of 
remote and idealized pasts has not changed much since the early twentieth century, 
and neither has the virulence of debates. But the polarization between 
conservation—true, scientific, honest, legitimate and modern—and reconstruction—
false, deceitful, illegitimate, destructive, nostalgic and reactionary—is a false 
dichotomy. It negates the modernity and the scientific drive of the nineteenth-century 
restorationist movement, which openly acknowledged its inventive nature. It also 
masks the fact that the lines between restoration and conservation often remained 
blurred after the anti-restorationist turn. The commemoration of the Heidelberger 
Schloßstreit as the birthday of the modern conservation movement in Germany by 
subsequent generations of Denkmalpfleger often leads one to forget that postwar 
reconstruction involved restoration, that is, historicist rebuilding on a much larger 
scale than during the ‘age of historicism’. 
 
What then of the post-Communist era reconstructions such as the Frauenkirche in 
Dresden, the Berlin Humboldforum, or the remarkable Kolumba in Cologne? This era 
seems, by the way, itself to be coming to a close. On some level these 
reconstructions do indeed seem anachronistic in the way they have privileged a 
nineteenth-century idea of restoration over the, by now, standard preservation of the 
status quo. But, as stated above, the history of conservation is far from linear. 
Moreover, while the demolition of the Palast der Republik in Berlin raises problematic 
questions about the erasure of the GDR past and the silencing of a strong opposition 
against the Prussification of the Federal Republic, the reconstruction of the 
Frauenkirche and the transformation of the ruined church of St Kolumba into a 
diocesan art museum combine restorationist and conservationist thought. Neither 
building tries to pretend to be new, as both keep temporalities and narratives visibly 
separate in the architectural fabric. 
 
Like the others in the forum, I have personal aesthetic preferences. However, when it 
comes to the right ways to deal with historic architecture, I am a pluralist. My 
reactionsto the results of interventions depend a bit on which hat I have on: as a 
student whose 
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main training as an undergraduate was in medieval architectural history, I want as 
many traces as possible to be preserved for their source value (damn Viollet-le-Duc.. 
.). As a historian of the modern period, I am fascinated by what destructions, 
rebuildings and alterations tell us about the moment of intervention. There are only 
ever three choices, as the first postwar issue of Die Kunstpflege in 1947 succinctly 
put it: ‘reconstruction or new construction, to preserve or to relinquish, pious revival 
or bold redesign’. What seems interesting to me are the reasons why one solution is 
chosen over another in particular cases and the passions these choices raise! And I 
think plurality is good. Wouldn’t it be terribly monotonous if all solutions were the 
same? Finally, as a contemporary and a citizen, I am with Stefan Laube in thinking 
that the needs of the past, present and future must be taken into account together. 
What ultimately matters most to me is whether the treatment of a building, that is, an 
area in the city, can help to construct a society that values democracy, peace, 
equality, diversity and that helps to increase the wellbeing of its citizens. And this is 
not solely decided by architectural form but by processes of debate and decision-
making. 
 
 
5. Can historicism do any more than encourage a superficial understanding 
of what it represents? Can medievalism, for example, really allow the middle 
ages to ‘speak back’ from the margins and bring medieval history and 
historians into a productive dialogue with modern? 
 
Laube: The middle ages have a particularly hard time gaining recognition as a 
legitimate theme for German public remembrance. The term itself expresses a 
certain awkwardness, referring as it does to an intermediate, in other words fairly 
insignificant period of time between classical antiquity and innovative modernity. 
Tellingly, the media often refer to the Dark Ages (Dunkles Mittelalter) in an attempt to 
convey conditions diametrically opposed to our civilizational level. When the so-
called ISIS disseminated its execution videos, many in the West were quick to agree 
that we are dealing here with a perverted organization from the Dunkles Mittelalter. 
And yet members of ISIS use the latest technologies to deal with the media, and the 
term ‘Dark Ages’ fails to recognize the fact that there was a highly fruitful exchange 
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in trade, science and culture between East and West during the high middle ages in 
particular. 
 
Anyone who compares historicism with the discipline of history will find that they 
are often like chalk and cheese. The writing of thick books devoid of pictures is 
traditionally the business of historians—Ranke, Droysen and Treitschke in the 
nineteenth century and Nipperdey, Wehler and Osterhammel in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries. You almost get the feeling that historians are afraid of pictures, 
perceiving them as mere uninvited guests that detract attention away from their 
arguments. Historicism in the sense of popular remembrance, meanwhile, is image-
friendly and operates in spaces and material cultures; texts are at most a bonus. 
Historicism seems forced to perform a permanent balancing act: it proclaims its 
authenticity while at the same time meeting mythical needs. The problematic 
relationship between the discipline of history and historicism is notably evident in 
Heinz Schilling’s biography of Luther. This author vociferously rejects the idea that 
he contributes to Luther mythology in any way, yet at the same time he has no 
choice but to fortify this mythology, committed as he is to the traditional genre of a 
vita, adding one more description of Luther’s life to the many that exist already. 
 
Historicism has one goal above all else: it aims to familiarize people with historical 
materials, to visualize them, to impart them to as many people as possible. The level 
of the mise en scène is so alluring because it creates space for suggestions of 
authenticity that function to satisfy human beings’ historical longings. Everything that 
drew on the depths of the past and was capable of establishing continuity or 
bestowing a sense of orientation seemed to be legitimate in nineteenth-century 
public discourse—history was the pre-eminent interpretative force at the time and it 
was imperative to use it to remember on a regular basis, through the medium of 
easily remembered imagery and figures. Today, however, it seems to have become 
common practice to preserve historical pasts, at least in a material and performative 
sense, when they have already ceased to be a component of one’s own perception 
of the world. The associated events have become elements of leisure time and 
folkloric fairs. They no longer help provide the individual with an ideological compass 
as they still did in the nineteenth century. Instead it is the touristic aspects of city 
marketing that dominate. Visitors are after events and entertainment; 
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they want experiences that contrast with everyday life. Many people would 
appear to be well satisfied if they can turn up at the office wearing Luther-themed 
socks inscribed with ‘Here I stand; I can do no other.’ 
 
Bildhauer: This question goes with the third: what can our ideas about the middle 
ages actually tell us about the middle ages? In some senses, not much. The needs 
and preconceptions of the present will never allow a transparent window into the 
past.  
 
However, I sense at the heart of this question a distinction between ‘medievalism’ 
and ‘medieval history and historians’ that is between the academy and the rest of the 
world. This elitism—that people in History departments somehow have a unique 
access to the past that others don’t—is something that needs to be broken down, 
and medievalism studies have been at the forefront of doing so. Somebody trying to 
fashion an outfit for a medieval convention with medieval techniques might arrive at 
insights about medieval crafts that are no less valuable than those gleaned by the 
archival research more typical of academics. It’s admirable and important that 
professional historians have higher standards of evidence and providing the 
information needed to retrace the evidence, but there is still a value in academic 
involvement in practical research. Professional historians in the twentieth century 
have simply spent much more time and (often public) money on investigating the 
past than amateurs, but perhaps this is changing in the twenty-first century, with 
research becoming a less dominant part of academic jobs and amateurs now taking 
on serious commitments of time and money— one only needs to look at the price of 
chainmail to see that. 
 
Goebel: I wonder whether one can really draw a hard and fast line between the 
academic study of the medieval past and popular medievalism, between scholarly 
history and cultural memory? First of all, historians have never been immune to the 
historical preoccupations of their societies, but, more importantly, they themselves 
have often helped fuel popular medievalism. Public engagement between academic 
and public history is not a new thing. Professional historians have had an impact on 
middlebrow medievalism in manifold ways. They have penned best-selling 
biographies of medieval kings, advised publishers of school textbooks, and helped 
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with curating exhibitions and so on. For instance, in the Weimar Republic, history 
professors were consulted in the competition for the national war memorial that was 
to be set up at the place most central to Germany on either historical or geographical 
grounds. Historical scholarship met popular representations of the past when 
academics of the University of Bonn acted as experts on behalf of the Rhineland’s 
bid to house that new national monument, arguing that the region had been the very 
centre of medieval Germany. Scholars involved in commemorative activities 
managed to give an air of academic credibility or modern scientific scholarship 
(Wissenschaftlichkeit) to narratives of continuity that were, in the main, speculative, 
eclectic and ambiguous. Superficiality does not just creep in from the margins. 
 
The study of historicisms would be a great platform for medievalist and modern 
historians and classicists to meet. There has been a lot of emphasis on 
interdisciplinarity in our subject for some time now. That is certainly a laudable 
development, but there is the danger that we neglect intra-disciplinary dialogue. 
Reading Elizabeth Vandiver’s fascinating monograph on classical representations in 
poetry of the First World War made me aware of the need for more collaborative 
work. War poetry was saturated with allusions to the ancient world. While evocations 
and reworkings of Troy or Thermopylae are easily spotted, other references are so 
extremely subtle (for example, imitations of metrical styles) that they would probably 
escape most modern historians. At the same time, a deep knowledge of the social 
and cultural history of the First World War is required to contextualize these findings. 
I suspect that the study of classicism or ‘Classical Presences’ (the title of a 
stimulating book series) is dominated by classicists, while medievalists have often 
been in the vanguard of medievalism studies. It may be that ‘-isms’ are a less useful 
category for fostering a dialogue across historical disciplines, and that cultural 
memory could prove a more useful and integrative organizing concept. 
 
Swenson: Historicism does indeed do more than encourage a superficial 
understanding of what it represents! It gives all the manifold insights into the 
revivalist period mentioned above. I also think that the imaginative and embodied 
encounter via historicism and especially medievalism (be it through restored 
buildings, re-enactments, historical novels, films or computer games) does often lead 
to the wish to learn more about ‘the real’ middle ages. It certainly did this for me 
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growing up. But does it actually matter if it does not? Is an encounter necessarily 
superficial if it is not wissenschaftlich? Although nineteenth-century historicism itself 
bequeathed us the search for ‘true’ knowledge, it was also imaginative and saw 
value in emotional or creative experiences. Might this precedent not soothe anxiety 
about superficiality? 
 
Anxious or not, there is no way to avoid the interventions of historicism. Sources 
have been irrevocably transformed by historicist (and other) interventions. It might be 
most apparent in the built environment, where architectural layers have been 
removed while others have been added. But even where they are not physically 
altered, the moving of objects, the framing of editions, the ordering of archives have 
all altered the interpretative framework. Medievalism and historicism thus offer above 
all a broader object lesson on how contemporary concerns and questions shape any 
interpretation of the past. But the tension between ‘reality’ and ‘imagination’ also 
poses another question for me. Imagination, immersion and embodiment still clearly 
matter today for many— as they did during the nineteenth century. Why this is the 
case seems an interesting question in itself. Maybe one should take some inspiration 
from the age of historicism and take imagination, emotion and senses more seriously 
to understand where the desire for immersion comes from and how it has changed 
over time. Rather than getting all worked up about immersion as superficial, we 
should perhaps consider more how historians can meaningfully communicate how 
the intellectual and sensorial world of the past was fundamentally different. 
 
Marchand: I think history often speaks to all of us, amateurs and professionals, best 
when he feel we understand how it was lived. What was it like to be Marie 
Antoinette, or to inhabit the slave quarters at Oak Alley Plantation, just down the 
road from me in Louisiana? In fact, for many years, recreated plantation houses did 
not take tour groups to slave quarters, surely because the tour operators were 
uninterested in offering visitors the opportunity to empathize with the slaves. Of 
course some historical recreations, and some history paintings, are better than 
others, better not just because more archaeologically accurate or detailed, but better 
because they give us a deep feeling for past life-worlds. Sometimes they remind us 
that the people in the past were like us—I’m thinking of Lawrence Alma-Tadema’s 
powerful The Death of the First Born, which shows an Egyptian Pharoah and his wife 
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grieving over their dead son’s body. Or, sometimes they tell us that the past was a 
different country—that it was normal for Romans to believe the prophecies of people 
who were professional inspectors of animal entrails, as Shakespeare’s Julius 
Caesar, and, more recently, the ‘Rome’ mini-series showed. 
 
Can history ‘speak back’? I am really very worried about Stefan Laube’s comment 
that it cannot, and that at least for the general public, historical experience has been 
reduced to the buying of Luther socks. Perhaps the thick, picture-less books of which 
he writes (I am guilty of writing one myself) are partly to blame for this—though I 
would argue that the research imperative and the high cost of picture permissions 
means that many of us can do no other. We should also remember Stefan Goebel’s 
excellent point that professional historians have often contributed to ‘middlebrow’ 
history as well as to the production of specialized books. All my undergraduate 
teaching, for example, is dedicated to the proposition that history continues to speak 
to us, all the time. And I think most of us understand, implicitly if not explicitly, 
Schiller’s insistence that philosophical abstractions do not warm the heart; but poetry 
and imaginative ‘play’ do, and prepare us for empathy, and deeper forms of thought. 
But, beyond the classroom, today we are perhaps too hesitant to make the case that 
we can help channel the past—the legacy of professional modesty! In future, it might 
be wise for us to embrace imagination, and especially forms of historical imagination, 
more openly, and with more confidence that we can bridge the socks and the books, 
and participate in a wider community that is both creative and scholarly. 
 
We might also be setting the bar too high for what constitutes ‘speaking back’, or 
looking in the wrong places to find evidence of it. I think those who have tried to 
construct a faux Gothic apse for a Wagnerian stage set would say that the past does 
speak back: this is harder to do than one thought! How did they do it, without duct 
tape, one wonders next? I think virtually all architects, artists and writers (not to 
speak of historians) who study the works of their forebears (and who doesn’t?) also 
feel they must innovate and/or speak to their own times as well; the good ones have 
always felt, as Harold Bloom argued many years ago, ‘the anxiety of influence’. 
Some thereby do violence to what the past was actually like, consciously or not, 
while others may capture that sense of the uncanny that allows us to escape the 
prison of presentism. The good ones separate 
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bad or senseless historicizing from meaningful historicizing—an example would 
be Gottfried Semper, who exulted in neo-Renaissance styles, in large part because 
they opposed an architectural language of Napoleonic Empire (or courtly baroque) 
with the language of the (idealized) Florentine Republic, with its emphasis on the 
republican participation in the affairs of state. Semper loved the Greeks, but not 
mindless neoclassicism; he liked the medieval court at the 1851 Exhibition, but not 
the Gothicizing piano. And aren’t we glad he indulged his historicizing imagination? 
 
Did the medievalizing of the pre-Raphaelites allow the middle ages to speak back, 
to take a slightly different example? Yes, of course it did! It provoked the 
retranslating of Dante and the study of medieval paints and tapestry designs; but we 
should not lose sight of the fact that all these things took patience as well as 
imagination, a faculty which, when untutored, cannot go beyond itself. What I am 
most concerned about today is precisely this lack of patience, and contempt for older 
skills, whether humanistic, artistic or mechanical. In this high-tech age, we are so 
thoroughly deskilling ourselves that soon no one will be able to understand what it 
was like to mix one’s own paints, to carve Gothic furniture or to read texts in Old 
Avestan, all skills the nineteenth century revived in order to extend its capacities for 
both empathy and innovation. Can we no longer appreciate Gerôme (and simply 
denounce his ‘orientalizing’ subject matter) because we can’t empathize with his 
remarkable technical skills? Do universities dispense with philologists who can read 
Avestan because students find it just too hard to learn this language, and specialize 
in contemporary film instead? One remarkable classicist I know who writes on the 
classical tradition (and Stefan Goebel is right that it is mostly classicists who do this) 
tells me that he wrote his juvenile love poetry in Latin, and thus can hear poetic 
metre in nineteenth-century works in ways that certainly escape me. Will any of our 
students be able to do these things? If we are to preserve the richness of our means 
of engaging with the past, we are also going to need to defend the conservation of 
some of the past’s methods, and forms of craftsmanship. We need to hang on to a 
kind of slow historicism, in which patience and the cultivation of specialized skills 
teach us how to listen to the past, if we hope to do more than project our hopes, or, 
as the discussion above about ISIS suggests, our fears, backwards in time. 
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Historicism, in short, seems to me something we should cultivate rather than 
condemn. In a culture that seems to idolize the self and selfishness, utility and 
speed, we ought to promote the virtues of understanding and appreciating, rather 
than simply judging and condemning, the thought-worlds of the past. The decline in 
enrolments that we have experienced in this utilitarian and STEM-crazed century 
might be addressed, at least in part, by engaging the pleasures of the imagination 
and defending the ethical implications of empathy, as well as cultivating the skills 
necessary to make historical empathy rich and meaningful. Set free the owl of 
Minerva! We need historicism now, more than ever. 
